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Performing a task alone or together with another agent can produce different outcomes.
The current study used event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to
investigate the neural underpinnings when participants performed a Go/Nogo task alone
or complementarily with another co-actor (unseen), whom was believed to be another
human or a computer. During both complementary tasks, reaction time data suggested
that participants integrated the potential action of their co-actor in their own action
planning. Compared to the single-actor task, increased parietal and precentral activity
during complementary tasks as shown in the fMRI data further suggested representation
of the co-actor’s response. The superior frontal gyrus of the medial prefrontal cortex
was differentially activated in the human co-actor condition compared to the computer
co-actor condition. The medial prefrontal cortex, involved thinking about the beliefs
and intentions of other people, possibly reflects a social-cognitive aspect or self-other
discrimination during the joint task when believing a biological co-actor is present. Our
results suggest that action co-representation can occur even offline with any agent
type given a priori information that they are co-acting; however, additional regions are
recruited when participants believe they are task-sharing with another human.
Keywords: joint Simon task, Go/Nogo, biological co-actor, action representation, medial prefrontal cortex
Introduction
The Simon eﬀect (Simon and Small, 1969) is a well-known phenomenon, in which participants
carry out responses that are either congruently or incongruently matched with the stimuli (see
Simon and Berbaum, 1990; Lu and Proctor, 1995 for reviews). For example, a common protocol
for a Simon task is to ask participants to carry out button presses with either their left or right hand
in response to stimuli that randomly appear on the left or right of the screen (e.g., use left hand to
respond to green circles and right hand to respond to red circles). Even though the location of the
stimulus is task-irrelevant, responses are typically faster when they are spatially congruent with the
hand used to respond. This eﬀect disappears if participants are asked to perform with one response
key, i.e., in a Go/Nogo task (Sebanz et al., 2003; Dolk et al., 2014; Pﬁster et al., 2014).
The joint Simon task, also known as the social Simon task (Sebanz et al., 2003), is when two
participants perform the Simon task together, each doing half of the task, in other words, they are
doing complementary Go/Nogo tasks. This time each participant only uses one hand to respond
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to stimuli that randomly appear on the left or right of the screen
(e.g., one participant respond to green circles and the other
participant respond to red circles). However, this also produces
a Simon eﬀect: the participant positioned on the right responds
faster to stimuli on the right of the screen (and vice versa for the
participant sitting on the left). Thus it is known as the joint Simon
eﬀect.
In the history of studying the joint Simon eﬀect, there has been
a number of theories proposed aiming to explain its mechanism.
Some theories emphasize “social” mechanisms (Knoblich and
Sebanz, 2006; Sebanz et al., 2006a; Tsai et al., 2006; Tsai and
Brass, 2007; Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009), when performing the
task together, the joint Simon eﬀect is caused by the integration
of the other person or the other person’s action into one’s own
action planning, task representation, or body representation (i.e.,
action co-representation, Sebanz et al., 2003, 2006a; Wenke et al.,
2011). On the other hand, according to the spatial response
coding account (Guagnano et al., 2010; Dittrich et al., 2012, 2013)
the joint Simon eﬀect occurs because the co-actor or attention-
attracting objects provides a reference for the participant to code
their actions spatially. However, both social and spatial response
coding accounts fail to explain a number of observations. For
example, it has been demonstrated that the knowledge about
the co-actor’s task is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for the
Simon eﬀect to occur (Dolk et al., 2013a). Through a series of
behavioral experiments, Dolk et al. (2011) demonstrated reliable
joint Simon eﬀects when the co-actor was not actively involved
and even when the co-actor was absent; in another study, Dolk
et al. (2013a) have successfully shown that non-biological objects,
such as Japanese waving cat, a clock, or a metronome can
generate joint Simon eﬀect. Recently, building on the theory
of event coding (Hommel, 2009), which is derived from earlier
ideomotor and common coding frameworks (Prinz, 1984, 1997),
Dolk et al. (2014) suggested a more comprehensive referential
coding account that integrates aspects of previous theories; social
and spatial response coding. According to this account, response
conﬂict occurs when activation of multiple action representations
are activated at the same time, and referential coding is required
to distinguish between concurrently activated salient events.
As the similarity of action events increases, the diﬃculty to
discriminate between alternative codes is greater, leading to larger
Simon eﬀects.
The joint Simon eﬀect has been studied mostly using
behavioral (e.g., Colzato et al., 2012a,b; Liepelt et al., 2013; Sellaro
et al., 2015) or ERP measures (e.g., Sebanz et al., 2006b; Tsai
et al., 2006; de Bruijn et al., 2008); however, due to the several
technical restraints of the functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) scanner, such as huge machinery dimensions, loud noise,
and horizontal lying position inﬂuencing the social dimension
of experimental settings (Costantini et al., 2013), there lacks
suﬃcient studies on the neural correlates of the joint Simon eﬀect.
To our knowledge, only one experiment using fMRI has been
published to investigate the joint Simon eﬀect (Sebanz et al.,
2007). In the fMRI study by Sebanz et al. (2007), a confederate
entered the fMRI scanning room with the participant to carry
out the joint Simon task. By contrasting joint Simon task and
Go/Nogo task, several activated regions were identiﬁed. Using
Nogo trials as a baseline, Go trails showed increased activation
in the medial frontal cortex, anterior cingulate gyrus, and frontal
eye ﬁelds, which are possibly related to metacognition and self-
relevance. During Nogo trials (with Go trials as a baseline), when
it was the confederate’s turn, the parietal lobe and supplementary
motor area were more activated, which reﬂected increased
inhibition to refrain from acting when it was the other’s turn.
These brain patterns likely reﬂect a social cognitive-aspect of the
joint Simon task. However, in order to conquer the technical
restraints, Sebanz et al. (2007) used an intricate apparatus setup,
in which a confederate acted with the participant using a response
box placed upon the participant’s belly, and a set of mirrors was
positioned on the head coil so that the participant could see
their own hand and the hand of the co-actor. With this kind
of experimental setting, the joint Simon eﬀect that Sebanz et al.
(2007) observed could be attributed to either the social or the
spatial response coding factor. Hence, the mechanism of the joint
Simon eﬀect remained equivocal.
Therefore, given that there were very few (and perhaps only
one) fMRI studies and inspired by some behavioral and ERP
studies that successfully induced the joint Simon eﬀect with an
unseen co-actor (e.g., Tsai et al., 2008; Vlainic et al., 2010; Dolk
et al., 2013b), the current experiment aimed to re-investigate
the joint Simon eﬀect by using event-related fMRI and adopted
a pure belief paradigm as in Tsai et al.’s (2008) ERP study, in
which the participant performed the joint Simon task with a
believed human co-actor or a computer co-actor located outside
the scanning room. A solo Go/Nogo task served as a control. The
aims of the current study are to examine three main questions:
(1) what are the neural underpinnings of the joint Simon
eﬀect? The standard Simon task draws on inhibitory control
to resolve response conﬂict of multiple concurrently activated
responses. fMRI studies have found that these tasks activate the
fronto-parietal regions including the anterior cingulate cortex,
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus, posterior
parietal cortex, and anterior insula (Nee et al., 2007; Schumacher
et al., 2007) as well as visuospatial and visual attention processing
areas (Liu et al., 2004). Given that the behavioral Simon eﬀect
of joint Simon tasks, we expect to see similar activations in
these areas in conditions where there is a signiﬁcant joint Simon
eﬀect. (2) We want to address whether joint Simon eﬀects can
be observed when the participants are told that the co-actor is
a computer. If social factors are essential to generate the joint
Simon eﬀect, then we would expect to observe the eﬀect only
in the belief of biological co-actor condition, and not in the
non-human co-actor condition (as in Tsai and Brass, 2007; Tsai
et al., 2008). On the other hand, if spatial response coding is
essential for the joint Simon eﬀect, then we would probably
not be able to observe any joint Simon eﬀect in the current
experimental setting. However, according to theories derived
from ideomotor theories, such as theory of event coding or the
referential coding account, the presence of another co-acting
agent could produce the joint Simon eﬀect, therefore, it is possible
to observe joint Simon eﬀects in both biological and computer
co-actors. (3) The last question is whether there are diﬀerences
between the participants’ belief of co-actor agent. The medial
prefrontal cortex has been implicated as a region for social
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cognition, and is activated when thinking about the self and
others (Amodio and Frith, 2006). Sebanz et al. (2007) found
increased orbitofrontal cortex activation, a part of the medial
frontal cortex, when co-acting with another person in the joint
Simon task compared to the single actor condition. We further
hypothesize that the medial prefrontal cortex activity would be
higher in the biological co-actor computer co-actor condition if
social cognitive processes are involved.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Thirty-six healthy participants (18 males and 18 females) from
southern Taiwan participated in the experiment (age range= 20–
30 years, mean age = 22.25 years, SD = 2.05 years). The
participants were right-handed (indicated by the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory), had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision, and no history of psychological or neural disorders. Their
BDI, BAI, and IQ scores were in the normal range (BDI: 0–10;
BAI: 0–8; Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices test score: 34–
59). All participants provided their written informed consent,
and the study protocol was approved (NO: B-ER-101-144) by the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the National Cheng Kung
University Hospital, Tainan, Taiwan. All participants were paid
600 NTD after completion of the experiment.
Experimental Setting and Design
Wemanipulated four diﬀerent conditions: (1) believed biological
agent co-actor joint Simon task, (2) computer co-actor joint
Simon task, (3) single Go/Nogo task, and (4) standard Simon
task. The ﬁrst three conditions were presented in a random
order between participants (perfectly counterbalanced using a
3 × 3 Latin square), while the standard Simon task was always
situated last to minimize task interference, such as carryover
eﬀects (Ansorge and Wuhr, 2004, 2009; Lugli et al., 2013).
At the beginning of experiment, participants were acquainted
with a confederate who pretended to be another participant
participating in the experiment. The participant and confederate
wrote questionnaires together, and practiced performing a joint
Simon task together (16 trials in total). During the practice,
the participant always sat to the right of the confederate,
while a colored circle target (either red or green) would
appear on either the right or left side. Each were assigned
to respond to a speciﬁc color (which was counterbalanced
between participants), with the participant using his/her right
hand to press “9” (located right on the keyboard) and the
confederate using his/her right hand to press “4” (located
left on the keyboard) when each person’s assigned color was
detected.
The participant was told that he/she would do the task in the
fMRI scanner, while his/her partner was signed up to participate
in the co-acting behavioral task outside. To reinforce the belief
of interacting with another participant, before the believed
biological agent co-actor condition, the participant and the
confederate were allowed to communicate through an intercom
system. In reality, however, the responses were controlled by
a computer (the response time varying randomly from 300 to
450 ms). Once a response was made, the stimuli are removed
from the screen.
In the computer co-actor joint Simon task, participants were
told to respond to one color, and that the computer responded
to the other color (the response time varied randomly from 300
to 450 ms). In the single Go/Nogo task, participants were told
that they were to carry out this task alone; they were asked to
respond to the target color, and to inhibit responding to the
non-target color. Lastly, in the standard Simon task, participants
responded to one color with the right hand, and to the other color
with the left hand. However, due to the absence of Nogo trials in
the standard Simon task, only behavioral results of the standard
Simon task are reported.
Stimuli and Procedure
Stimuli presentation was rear-projected onto a screen inside the
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner that was 95 cm away
from the observer. Participants viewed the display through a
mirror that was placed above the head coil. The visual stimuli
consisted of two circles (with ∼2.5 cm radius and 5 cm between
the disks) horizontally placed within a white rectangle frame
(∼15 cm × 5 cm in width and height). In each trial, one of the
circles will be colored either green or red (serving as a target),
and the remaining circle will be white. Each circle extended
∼3◦ from the center. Participants held two Current Designs
ﬁber optic response pads, one in each hand. The response pads
each have four buttons from top to down in vertical view; and
participants were instructed at the beginning to hold the response
pad vertically and response using only the topmost button (and
ignore all the other buttons).
At the beginning of each trial, a ﬁxation cross was presented
for 500 ms. This was followed by the target which was displayed
on the screen up to 1400 ms or a response was given. Participants
were instructed to respond to their assigned color by pressing a
button on a response pad. In joint tasks (biological and computer
co-actor conditions), the responses made by the computer were
randomized within 300–450 ms to make it seem as if another
person was responding. Afterward, a blank screen (lasting from
0 to 8 s) followed before the start of the next trial.
Each condition constituted a separate run (therefore four runs
in total). Each run consisted of 160 trials (with 40 trials for
each trial type: Go-congruent, Go-incongruent, Nogo-congruent,
Nogo-incongruent), lasting ∼9.5 min. The order and the timing
of each trial was pseudorandomized using optseq2 (Dale, 1999)
to provide an optimum jittered sequence. Stimulus presentation
was controlled using E-PRIME 2.0 software (Psychology Software
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA).
Behavioral Analyses
Error trials and outliers (greater than three interquartile range
from the mean) were removed from analysis. A repeated-measure
2 × 4 ANOVA with factors condition (believed biological agent
co-actor joint Simon task, computer co-actor joint Simon task,
single Go/Nogo task, and standard Simon task) and congruency
(congruent versus incongruent) was conducted.
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Imaging Parameters and Data Analyses
Imaging was performed using the GE MR750 3T scanner (GE
Medical Systems, Waukesha, WI, USA) in the MRI center of
National Cheng Kung University. High resolution anatomical
images were acquired using fast-SPGR, consisting of 166 axial
slices (TR = 7.6 ms, TE = 3.3 ms, ﬂip angle = 12◦, 224 × 224
matrices, slice thickness = 1 mm). Functional images were
acquired using a gradient-echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) pulse
sequence (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 33 ms, ﬂip angle = 90◦,
64 × 64 matrices, slice thickness = 3 mm, no gap, voxel size
3.5 mm × 3.5 mm × 3 mm, 40 axial slices covering the entire
brain).
The data was preprocessed and analyzed using BrainVoyager
QX (Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands) and
customized Matlab scripts (2010a, The MathWorks, Inc.,
Natick, MA, USA). Functional images were corrected for head
movements using six-parameter rigid transformations, after
slice timing correction, by realigning all volumes to the ﬁrst
functional volume. High-pass ﬁltering of two cycles and spatial
smoothing of 4 mm FWHM were applied. For each participant,
the functional scan was co-registered to the anatomical scan and
then transformed into Talairach space (Talairach and Tournoux,
1988).
Statistical analyses were performed ﬁrst at the individual
level using general linear modeling (GLM). Incorrect trials
and outliers were not modeled; reaction times were modeled.
Contrast images for each participant were then subjected to a
random eﬀects group analysis to identify common brain regions
across participants that show main eﬀects and interactions
between response and congruency. All statistical thresholds were
corrected for multiple comparisons using the alphasim command
in Matlab, Neuroelf (http://neuroelf.net/) to keep the familywise
error rate under 5%, and the corrected threshold was set at
p< 0.005 and cluster size>20 voxels. Visualization was also aided
by Neuroelf.
Results
Behavioral Results
Overall Behavioral Data Summary
The overall accuracy was high (98.88% across all conditions),
erroneous trials were eliminated from analysis (error rates of
each condition were 0.6, 0.3, 0.4, and 2.6% for the biological
co-actor, computer co-actor, single Go/Nogo, and standard
Simon conditions, respectively). 1.98% of the remaining go trials
were classiﬁed as outliers and thus not considered. To compare
performance between the four conditions, a condition (biological
co-actor, computer co-actor, single Go/Nogo, and right hand of
standard Simon) × congruency (congruent versus incongruent)
ANOVA was conducted. There were signiﬁcant main eﬀects for
both condition [F(3,105) = 116.18, p < 0.001] and congruency
[F(1,35) = 31.88, p < 0.001]. The interaction between
condition and congruency was also signiﬁcant [F(3,105) = 15.45,
p < 0.001]. Post hoc analysis showed that the reaction times
during the Standard Simon condition task was longer than all
three conditions (all ts > 11.79, all ps < 0.001); there were no
diﬀerences among the remaining three conditions (all ts < 0.93,
all ps> 0.36).
Given that the Simon eﬀect in the standard Simon condition
is much larger than the eﬀects in the other conditions, the
inclusion of these data may be suﬃcient to drive the main eﬀect
of congruency and the interaction with condition, a separate
3 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with only
the three single hand conditions (biological co-actor, computer
co-actor, single Go/Nogo). There were no main eﬀects for
condition [F(2,70) = 0.49, p = 0.62], there was a main eﬀect for
congruency [F(1,35) = 10.20, p = 0.003], and a near signiﬁcant
interaction between condition and congruency [F(2,70) = 3.00,
p = 0.056]. Next, post hoc analyses were performed; simple
main eﬀects of the condition × congruency interaction showed
a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between incongruent and congruent
trials in the biological co-actor, and computer co-actor tasks
[F(1,105) = 6.34, p = 0.01; F(1,105) = 14.59, p < 0.001], but no
congruency eﬀects in the single Go/Nogo task [F(1,105) = 1.42,
p = 0.24]. Results are shown in Figure 1.
fMRI Results
ANOVA: Main Effects and Interactions
A repeated-measures three-way ANOVA was performed at
the whole-brain level, with factors condition (biological co-
actor, computer co-actor, single Go/Nogo), response (Go versus
Nogo), and congruency (congruent versus incongruent). There
were signiﬁcant main eﬀects and interactions in various brain
regions. Figure 2 and Table 1 depict these results. In order to
investigate which levels drove the main eﬀects and interactions,
FIGURE 1 | Bar graph showing reaction time data of congruency
effects in believed biological co-actor, computer co-actor, single
Go/Nogo, and standard Simon conditions. Reaction times were slower in
the standard Simon task. Significant differences between incongruent and
congruent conditions were observed in the believed biological co-actor and
computer co-actor conditions, but not in the single Go/Nogo condition. Error
bars depict the standard error.
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FIGURE 2 | Montage of transversal slicing (the numbers indicate the z coordinates) of the ANOVA results of the joint Simon task, with factors
condition (biological co-actor, computer co-actor, and single Go/Nogo), response (Go versus Nogo), and congruency (congruent versus
incongruent). (A) main effect for condition, (B) main effect for response, (C) main effect for congruency, (D) two-way interaction of condition and response, (E)
two-way interaction of condition and congruency, (F) two-way interaction of response and congruency, and (G) three-way interaction of condition, response, and
congruency.
we followed-up the ANOVA results with post hoc t-tests using the
contrasts in Sebanz et al. (2007).
Effects of Co-action on Go Trials
Using Nogo trials as a baseline, we respectively compared
activity on Go trials among the two co-actor conditions
(believed biological agent co-actor and computer co-actor)
and the single Go/Nogo tasks (i.e., Go-congruent + Go-
incongruent > Nogo-congruent + Nogo-incongruent). The
contrasts are depicted in Figure 3. Peak coordinates of the
ROIs are listed in Table 2. These contrasts indicated that
the biological co-actor condition compared to the single
Go/Nogo condition showed higher activation in the cingulate
gyrus, posterior cingulate, cuneus, precuneus, inferior parietal
lobule, lingual gyrus, middle occipital gyrus, superior occipital
lobule, middle temporal gyrus, supramarginal gyrus, fusiform
gyrus, declive, middle frontal gyrus, and superior frontal gyrus,
and less activation in the insula. The computer co-actor
condition compared to the single Go/Nogo condition showed
higher activation in the same regions, with additional regions
including the anterior cingulate, superior parietal lobule, occipital
lobe Brodmann area 19, superior occipital gyrus, inferior
occipital gyrus, superior temporal gyrus, inferior temporal gyrus,
parahippocampal gyrus, angular gyrus, precentral gyrus, post-
central gryus, paracentral lobule, medial frontal gyrus, inferior
frontal gyrus, thalamus, culmen, culmen of vermis, pyramis,
lentiform nucleus, claustrum, but no diﬀerences in the superior
occipital lobule and insula. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
the biological and computer co-actor conditions occurred in
the anterior cingulate, posterior cingulate, cingulate gyrus,
precuneus, superior parietal lobule, middle occipital gyrus,
middle temporal gyrus, middle frontal gyrus, medial frontal
gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, lentiform nucleus, sub-gyral, extra-
nuclear, and culmen, declive.
Congruency Effects on Go Trials
Congruency eﬀects were calculated using Nogo trials as a
baseline in the believed biological co-actor, computer co-actor,
and single Go/Nogo conditions. We decided to implement
the Nogo trials as a baseline given the following reasons:
(1) the only other existing joint Simon fMRI study (Sebanz
et al., 2007) also used Nogo trials as a baseline; (2) the Nogo-
congruent trials to the participant would be the Go-incongruent
trials to the co-actor, thus the contrast “Go-congruent –
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TABLE 1 | Brain activation data of ANOVA results, with factors condition (biological co-actor, computer co-actor, and single Go/Nogo), response (Go
versus Nogo), and congruency (congruent versus incongruent).
# of voxels Talariach coordinates (peak)
Structure 3∗3∗3 x y z
Main effects
Main effect for condition
B Anterior cingulate (including anterior cingulate, medial frontal gyrus, superior frontal gyrus) 129 9 41 1
Main effect for response
B Culmen (including culmen, thalamus, declive, caudate, insula, culmen of vermis, inferior parietal lobule,
post-central gyrus, lentiform nucleus, cingulate gyrus, precentral gyrus, medial frontal gyrus, fusiform gyrus,
inferior frontal gyrus, inferior occipital gyrus, lingual gyrus, anterior cingulate, declive of vermis, middle occipital
gyrus, sub-gyral, claustrum, inferior temporal gyrus, pyramis, midbrain red nucleus, middle temporal gyrus,
superior parietal lobule, cuneus, middle frontal gyrus, superior frontal gyrus, posterior cingulate,
parahippocampal gyrus, supramarginal gyrus, tuber, cerebellar lingual, superior temporal gyrus, uvula, middle
temporal gyrus, precuneus)
16984 21 −49 −20
L Cingulate gyrus 174 0 −55 31
R Post-central gyrus (including post-central gyrus, precentral gyrus) 129 36 −25 52
L Angular gyrus (including angular gyrus, middle temporal gyrus, superior temporal gyrus) 103 −45 −70 34
L Middle frontal gyrus 66 −36 44 28
R Middle temporal gyrus 44 45 −55 28
Main effect for congruency
B Inferior temporal gyrus (including inferior temporal gyrus, middle occipital gyrus, lingual gyrus, cuneus,
fusiform gyrus, inferior occipital gyrus, precuneus, cingulate gyrus, declive, paracentral lobule, sub-gyral)
1308 −48 −73 −8
L Precentral gyrus (including precentral gyrus, middle frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus) 115 −45 −1 28
L Inferior frontal gyrus 27 −39 47 4
R Precuneus 61 27 −70 46
L Inferior parietal lobule (including inferior parietal lobule, superior temporal gyrus, angular gyrus, supramarginal
gyrus)
154 −36 −55 52
R Supramarginal gyrus 47 51 −46 37
R Middle occipital gyrus 38 27 −91 13
Two-way interactions
Condition × Response
B Cuneus (including cuneus, cingulate gyrus, precuneus, lingual gyrus, middle occipital gyrus, posterior
cingulate, occipital lobe Brodmann area 19, paracentral lobule, superior parietal lobule, middle temporal gyrus,
inferior parietal lobule, fusiform gyrus, declive, inferior temporal gyrus, superior temporal gyrus, thalamus, medial
frontal gyrus, angular gyrus, supramarginal gyrus, sub-gyral, culmen of vermis, anterior cingulate, post-central
gyrus, precentral gyrus, inferior occipital gyrus)
7586 0 −64 40
B Middle frontal gyrus (including middle frontal gyrus, superior frontal gyrus, medial frontal gyrus, inferior frontal
gyrus)
716 36 53 10
L Precentral gyrus (including precentral gyrus, superior frontal gyrus, middle frontal gyrus) 211 −45 2 43
R Middle temporal gyrus 44 54 −28 −17
L Precentral gyrus 23 −60 8 7
Condition × Congruency
B Cingulate gyrus (including cingulate gyrus, medial frontal gyrus, superior frontal gyrus, cingulate gyrus,
sub-gyral, anterior cingulate, middle frontal)
690 0 2 46
R Middle temporal gyrus (including middle temporal gyrus, middle occipital gyrus, superior temporal gyrus) 130 45 −58 10
B Declive (including declive, lingual gyrus, culmen of vermis) 328 −12 −67 −17
L Post-central gyrus (post-central gyrus, inferior parietal lobule, precentral gyrus) 197 −33 −22 46
L Lentiform nucleus 123 −27 2 1
R Precentral gyrus (including precentral gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus) 153 48 5 37
R Superior temporal gyrus cluster 1 109 45 −19 −5
R Superior temporal gyrus cluster 2 24 51 14 −14
L Middle occipital gyrus cluster 1 (including middle occipital gyrus, middle temporal gyrus) 52 −33 −85 19
L Middle occipital gyrus cluster 2 24 −30 88 −2
L Middle temporal gyrus 57 −51 −67 4
L Lingual gyrus (including lingual gyrus, thalamus) 64 −15 −43 −8
(Continued)
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TABLE 1 | Continued
# of voxels Talariach coordinates (peak)
Structure 3∗3∗3 x y z
R Post-central gyrus 26 45 −25 49
R Insula 76 45 14 1
L Insula cluster 1 (including inferior parietal lobule) 45 −42 −22 25
L Insula cluster 2 30 −30 20 10
L Superior temporal gyrus 26 −57 −10 1
R Lentiform nucleus 37 24 −7 7
L Culmen 21 −33 −52 −20
R Superior temporal gyrus 24 54 −4 4
L Precentral gyrus 39 −45 −4 25
Response × Congruency
L Middle occipital gyrus 115 −24 −88 4
L Cingulate gyrus 21 −15 20 31
L Parahippocampal gyrus 34 −21 −46 4
Three-way interactions
Condition × Reponse × Congruency
L Middle occipital gyrus 25 −27 −88 1
R Precuneus 52 36 −70 40
L Medial frontal gyrus 20 −6 68 −2
B Cingulate gyrus (including cingulate gyrus, cuneus) 57 −3 −43 31
∗B, L, and R denote bilateral, left, and right, respectively. All regions reached a significance threshold of p < 0.005 (uncorrected), and voxel threshold of at least 20
contiguous voxels.
FIGURE 3 | Montage of transversal slicing (the numbers indicate the z coordinates) of using Nogo trials as a baseline and comparing the activity of
Go trials in (A) biological co-actor condition versus the single-actor No/Nogo condition; (B) computer co-actor condition versus the single-actor
No/Nogo condition; and (C) biological co-actor condition versus the computer co-actor condition.
Nogo-congruent >Go-incongruent – Nogo-incongruent” would
be equivalent to “Go-congruent (for participant) + Go-
congruent (for co-actor) > Nogo-congruent (for participant) +
Nogo-congruent (for co-actor),” and (3) this contrast would also
parallel the standard Simon contrast “congruent (right hand) +
congruent (left hand)> incongruent (right hand)+ incongruent
(left hand).”
Congruency eﬀects were compared between the three single
hand conditions (believed biological agent co-actor, computer
co-actor, and single Go/Nogo task). The contrasts are shown in
Figure 4 and listed in Table 3. Compared to the single-actor
condition, the biological co-actor condition elicited higher
activation during congruent trials in the precuneus, cuneus,
inferior parietal lobule, post-central gyrus, and fusiform gyrus.
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TABLE 2 | Brain activation data.
Direction of
activation
# of voxels Talariach coordinates
(peak)
Structure 3∗3∗3 x y z
Contrast Biological co-actor versus single Go/Nogo
Go – Nogo
B Cuneus (including cuneus, cingulate gyrus, precuneus, posterior cingulate, lingual gyrus,
middle occipital gyrus, middle temporal gyrus, inferior parietal lobule, supramarginal gyrus,
fusiform gyrus, declive, superior occipital lobule)
+ 2816 0 −64 40
R Middle frontal gyrus cluster 1 (including middle frontal gyrus, superior frontal gyrus) + 101 36 53 10
R Middle frontal gyrus cluster 2 + 63 33 32 37
R Insula − 21 24 23 −8
Computer co-actor versus single Go/Nogo
Go – Nogo
B Cuneus (including cuneus, cingulate gyrus, occipital lobe Brodmann area 19, precuneus,
lingual gyrus, declive, posterior cingulate, fusiform gyrus, middle temporal gyrus, precentral
gyrus, inferior temporal gyrus, angular gyrus, middle occipital gyrus, medial frontal gyrus,
superior temporal gyrus, paracentral lobule, inferior occipital gyrus, culmen, superior parietal
lobule, inferior parietal lobule, supramarginal gyrus, superior occipital gyrus, parahippocampal
gyrus, culmen of vermis, post-central gyrus, pyramis, thalamus, anterior cingulate)
+ 7495 −3 −64 37
R Middle frontal gyrus (including middle frontal gyrus, medial frontal gryus, superior frontal
gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, precentral gyrus)
+ 703 36 53 10
L Superior frontal gryus + 28 −18 17 55
L Precentral gryus cluster 1 (including precentral gyrus, superior frontal gyrus, middle frontal
gyrus)
+ 262 −45 2 43
L Precentral gryus cluster 2 + 29 −54 14 1
L Post-central gyrus + 78 −48 −16 46
L Superior temporal gyrus + 22 −63 −40 7
R Precentral gyrus + 20 48 14 1
R Post-central gyrus + 23 51 −19 19
L Lentiform nucleus + 26 −12 2 1
L Claustrum + 35 −30 5 −2
R Thalamus + 20 9 −13 13
Biological co-actor versus computer co-actor
Go–Nogo
B Posterior cingulate (including posterior cingulate, culmen) − 83 12 −43 7
R Middle temporal gyrus cluster 1 − 70 60 −25 −20
R Middle temporal gyrus cluster 2 (including middle temporal gyrus, middle occipital gyrus) − 76 57 −55 10
L Anterior cingulate cluster 1 − 24 −9 35 1
L Anterior cingulate cluster 2 − 42 −3 26 19
R Inferior frontal gyrus − 38 18 26 −11
R Middle frontal gyrus (including middle frontal gyrus, medial frontal gyrus) − 129 15 44 −11
B Precuneus − 22 6 −46 64
L Middle frontal gyrus − 30 −24 47 25
L Middle temporal gyrus − 21 −57 −37 1
L Cingulate gyrus − 38 0 14 28
R Lentiform nucleus − 25 21 −4 −14
L Superior parietal lobule − 20 −33 −52 55
L Sub-gyral − 39 −18 5 58
L Extra-nuclear − 78 −24 20 −14
R Declive − 92 9 −82 −23
Regions within significant clusters showing significant differences of activation on (1) Go trials in the believed biological co-actor condition compared to the single actor
Go/Nogo condition; (2) Go trials in the believed computer co-actor condition compared to the single actor Go/Nogo condition; (3) Go trials in the believed biological
co-actor condition compared to the believed computer co-actor condition.
∗B, L, and R denote bilateral, left, and right, respectively. All regions reached a significance threshold of p < 0.005 (uncorrected), and voxel threshold of at least 20
contiguous voxels.
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FIGURE 4 | Montage of transversal slicing (the numbers indicate the z coordinates) of using Nogo trials as a baseline and comparing the activity of
congruent versus incongruent trials in (A) biological co-actor condition versus the single-actor No/Nogo condition; (B) computer co-actor condition
versus the single-actor No/Nogo condition; and (C) biological co-actor condition versus the computer co-actor condition.
TABLE 3 | Brain activation data.
Direction of activation # of voxels Talariach coordinates (peak)
Structure 3∗3∗3 x y z
Contrast Biological co-actor versus single Go/Nogo
congruent – incongruent
R Precuneus + 32 36 −58 40
L Inferior parietal lobule + 42 −54 −40 49
R Post-central gyrus + 20 9 −31 73
R Fusiform gyrus + 24 27 −76 −17
L Cuneus + 21 −6 −67 34
Computer co-actor versus single Go/Nogo
congruent – incongruent
L Lingual gyrus + 35 −21 −91 −2
R Inferior parietal lobule + 22 39 −58 49
R Precuneus + 61 36 −70 40
B Precuneus (including precuneus, cingulate gyrus, cuneus) + 106 3 −52 55
Biological co-actor versus computer co-actor
congruent – incongruent
L Superior frontal gyrus + 32 −6 62 −5
R Superior frontal gyrus + 21 9 59 −5
Using Nogo trials as a baseline, regions within significant clusters showing significant differences of activation on (1) congruent trials in the believed biological co-actor
condition compared to the single actor Go/Nogo condition; (2) congruent trials in the believed computer co-actor condition compared to the single actor Go/Nogo
condition; (3) congruent trials in the believed biological co-actor condition compared to the believed computer co-actor condition.
∗B, L, and R denote bilateral, left, and right, respectively. All regions reached a significance threshold of p < 0.005 (uncorrected), and voxel threshold of at least 20
contiguous voxels.
Compared to the single-actor condition, the computer co-
actor condition elicited higher activation during congruent
trials in the precuneus, inferior parietal lobule, and lingual
gyrus. The diﬀerence between the biological and computer
co-actor conditions in occurred in the bilateral superior
frontal gyrus, which is a part of the medial prefrontal
cortex.
Discussion
In this experiment, Simon eﬀects were observed both when
the participants believed they were interacting with a human
partner and while they were acting with a computer co-
actor. No Simon eﬀects were observed in the single Go/Nogo
condition. In the literature, reports of the joint Simon eﬀect
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appears to be very diverse. For example, some studies (Welsh
et al., 2007; Sellaro et al., 2013) suggested that without another
co-actor physically present (i.e., when they did the task through
a networked computer in another room), belief alone of
interacting with another agent is not suﬃcient to generate
the joint Simon eﬀect. However, believing was suﬃcient to
activate the processes of response co-representation in Tsai
et al.’s (2008) as well as in Ruys and Aarts (2010) study, in
which only one participant performed the joint Simon task
while believing they were interacting with the other, where
in fact their partner’s response was generated by a computer.
Although the experimenters found that while belief of a human
agent was enough to result in a joint Simon eﬀect, the joint
Simon eﬀect was not observed when the participants were
explicitly informed that they will be interacting with a computer
agent. Additionally, using blindfolded participants, it has been
shown that the joint Simon eﬀect does not rely on online
information about the co-actor’s actions, but that a priori
information about the co-actor’s presence is suﬃcient for the
eﬀect to occur (Sebanz et al., 2003; Vlainic et al., 2010). Whilst
these studies all suggested the necessity of a human co-actor,
several studies suggest that the joint Simon eﬀect is a result
of spatial response coding rather than a social inﬂuence on
action. Guagnano et al. (2010) found that the joint Simon
eﬀect occurred when the co-actor was within arm-reach of the
participant, but not when the co-actor was distantly seated. Other
studies have further demonstrated that a human co-actor is
not necessary, by providing salient reference-providing events,
such as implementing a Japanese waving cat, a clock, or a
metronome (Dolk et al., 2013a), experimenters were able to
induce joint Simon eﬀects with non-biological objects. The
current experiment, inspired by the referential coding account
of the joint Simon eﬀect, which combines aspects of both social
and spatial response coding factors, examined the joint Simon
eﬀect in both believed biological co-actor, believed computer
co-actor, and single Go/Nogo conditions to see when the
joint Simon eﬀect occurred and whether there are neurological
diﬀerences among these diﬀerent manipulations. We hope to
extend the knowledge of the joint Simon eﬀect with both
biological and non-biological co-actors compared to the single-
actor task.
Behaviorally, in the present experiment, the joint Simon
eﬀect was observed in both the biological and computer agent
condition, while the single Go/Nogo task did not produce a
Simon eﬀect. This ﬁnding is consistent with the report by Dolk
et al. (2013a) in that a biological agent is not necessary. In
addition, these results also show that the joint Simon eﬀect can
occur without online spatial coding of the other co-actor. It is
worthwhile to note that in our experimental setup, the fMRI
session was preceded by a practice joint Simon task outside the
scanner with a confederate. It is well-known that the Simon
eﬀect is due to the representation of two alternative responses
and that previous representations can easily be transferred to
subsequent tasks (Ansorge and Wuhr, 2004, 2009; Lugli et al.,
2013), thus it is possible that the practice block administrated
before the experiment might have introduced carryover eﬀects in
the subsequent fMRI tasks. However, this is most likely not the
case, since the single Go/Nogo task did not show any signiﬁcant
Simon eﬀects—only the believed human and computer co-actor
conditions did.
Turning to the neuroimaging data, by comparing the contrasts
of Go trials versus Nogo trials among the three conditions, co-
actor conditions (biological and computer) appeared to show
increased frontal and visual-parietal activity (including the
precentral gyrus, cuneus, precuneus, cingulate gyrus, inferior
parietal lobule, middle temporal gyrus, middle occipital gyrus,
superior occipital gyrus, etc.) compared to the single actor
Go/Nogo condition (see Figure 3 and Table 2). The increased
frontal and occipital areas likely reﬂect diﬀerences in stimulus
processing when performing with a co-actor (Sebanz et al.,
2007). The frontal areas likely reﬂect increased self-reﬂective
processing during Go trials, and top–down modulation of
stimulus valance on Go trials is reﬂected in the increased
activation of the visual association cortex. The inferior parietal
lobule and motor areas surrounding the precentral gyrus are
part of the mirror neuron system (Molenberghs et al., 2009)
and are found to be activated not only when one carries out
an action, but also when imagining an action or observing an
action carried out in another person (Blakemore and Decety,
2001; Buccino et al., 2001; Ruby and Decety, 2001). It has
been suggested that joint tasks act accordingly to the postulate
of the ideomotor theory, or common coding theory (Prinz,
1984), where at a certain representational level the planned
and perceived actions are functionally equivalent (Sebanz et al.,
2003; Tsai et al., 2006). In a similar associative visuomotor
task, ventral premotor cortex was involved in the anticipation
of a third-person’s response (Ramnani and Miall, 2004). Thus
it is not surprising to ﬁnd increased activation of such
areas during the co-actor condition (where anticipation and
observation of the co-actor’s response is involved) compared
to the single Go/Nogo condition. We suspect that increased
Go-Nogo activity (i.e., decreased Nogo-Go activity) in these
areas during the co-actor conditions compared to the single
Go/Nogo condition, indicates less inhibition during Nogo
trials as well as increased representations of their co-actor’s
responses. However, these ﬁndings contrast with Sebanz et al.
(2007) in that they observed decreased activity in the parietal
lobule when comparing the contrasts of Go and Nogo trials
between a human co-actor condition and the single Go/Nogo
condition. The authors suggested that this reﬂected increased
inhibition on Nogo trials when it is the other’s turn. At this
moment, however, our experimental design cannot distinguish
between action imagery/anticipation/observation and turn-
taking.
Next, by comparing the Go-Nogo contrast in the biological
and computer co-actor conditions, diﬀerences occurred in
more frontal areas (including the anterior cingulate gyrus,
inferior frontal gyrus, middle frontal gyrus, middle temporal
gryus), showing more activation during the computer co-
actor conditions. We speculate two possibilities underlying this
observation. Firstly, this implies that the contrast of Nogo-Go is
greater in the biological co-actor condition. This could indicate
greater demands on interference control (i.e., greater response
conﬂict) during Nogo trials in the biological co-actor compared
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to the computer co-actor condition. This is consistent with the
referential coding account (Dolk et al., 2014), in that conﬂict
resolution would be greater when representations of action event
are more similar (i.e., in the biological co-actor condition).
Second, in a study examining the neural basis of motor imagery
(Lorey et al., 2011), while areas of the parieto-premotor network
showed positive correlations with perceived vividness, negative
correlations were observed primarily in the frontal and temporal
areas (including the middle frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus,
the superior temporal gyrus, the middle cingulate cortex, the
middle part of the temporal gyrus, etc.). Thus, it is possible that
the activations in these areas suggest that actionmonitoring of the
co-actor occurs in both co-actor conditions; however, vividness
of motor imagery and perhaps self-other integration is more
pronounced in the biological co-actor condition.
By investigating the interaction of compatibility and co-action
on Go trials, the precuneus, inferior parietal lobule, superior
temporal gyrus, and several visual areas were found to show
increased compatibility eﬀects in the biological and computer co-
actor conditions compared to the single Go/Nogo condition (see
Figure 4 and Table 3). This could reﬂect increased processing
of the stimuli in a social context (Sebanz et al., 2007). The
parietal lobe is involved in the alerting and orienting networks of
attention (Posner and Petersen, 1990; Coull and Nobre, 1998; Raz
and Buhle, 2006). We suspect that during co-action, congruent
trials receive greater attention and furthermore has an eﬀect of
top-down modulation on the visual association cortex.
Most interestingly, there was signiﬁcant increased activation
in the medial prefrontal cortex on congruent trials in the
biological co-actor condition compared to the computer co-
actor condition. This implies that although the Simon eﬀects
were behaviorally similar in these two co-actor conditions, the
brain networks supporting the behavior are not totally the
same. The medial prefrontal cortex is involved in self-awareness
(e.g., Kelley et al., 2002; Goldberg et al., 2006), perspective
taking (Vogeley et al., 2004), as well as thinking about the
beliefs and intentions of other people (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2005;
Amodio and Frith, 2006). This region has also been reported
in Sebanz et al. (2007) when contrasting compatibility eﬀects
of a biological co-actor and a single Go/Nogo task and in
Ramnani and Miall (2004) when comparing brain activity of
third-person instruction cues with computer instruction cues.
Thus, although behaviorally the joint Simon eﬀect was observed
in both co-actor conditions (biological and computer), there
are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the medial prefrontal cortex, which
likely reﬂects a social-cognitive aspect of the joint Simon task
when believing a biological co-actor is present. It is also
possible that increased activation may also stem from more
general processes of action/conﬂict monitoring. It has been
shown that medial prefrontal cortex activation occurs when
diﬀerentiating the self from intimate others (Heatherton et al.,
2006), and according to the referential coding account, the need
to diﬀerentiate between self- and other- generated events should
be more pronounced the more the actor and the co-actor are
perceived as similar (i.e., biological co-actor condition). In one
study, using gray matter voxel-based morphometry, individual
diﬀerences of the joint Simon eﬀect were found to correlate
negatively with the gray matter of the medial prefrontal cortex
(i.e., individuals with greater gray matter showed lesser Simon
eﬀects), this probably reﬂects the role of the medial prefrontal
cortex in conﬂict resolution during joint action (Dolk et al., 2012).
Furthermore, using tDCS, cathodal stimulation (inhibitory) of
the medial prefrontal cortex led to increased joint Simon eﬀects
(Liepelt et al., in press), which suggested the involvement of the
medial prefrontal cortex in self-other discrimination during the
joint Simon task.
Our results do not ﬁt with the spatial response coding account
of the joint Simon eﬀect (Guagnano et al., 2010; Dittrich et al.,
2012, 2013), which suggests that the eﬀects strongly result from
the spatial location of the co-actor. In our experimental setting,
the participant was situated in the scanner room alone with no
spatial reference to the co-actor, thus online spatial coding should
not occur. Additionally, the joint Simon eﬀect was observed in
both believed biological and computer conditions, which also
disagrees with Tsai and Brass’s (2007), Tsai et al.’s (2008) view that
the eﬀect is tuned to conspeciﬁcs. We hypothesize that the joint
Simon eﬀect can occur as long as the participant believes that they
are interacting with another agent and can represent the agent’s
response even oﬄine, regardless of the agent’s identity. Thus,
our ﬁnding suggests that both biological and non-biological co-
actors can induce joint Simon eﬀects; however, additional medial
prefrontal cortex is recruited when the co-actor is believed to be
a human.
If neither social factors nor online spatial coding was essential
to generate the joint Simon eﬀect, then what might have resulted
in the joint Simon eﬀect in the current experiment? We suspect
that common coding not only occurred between perceived
events and intended actions, the participants additionally coded
perceived events and anticipated co-actor’s (either biological or
computer agent) responses. Ideomotor and common coding
theories do not diﬀerentiate between social and non-social (i.e.,
biological and computer) co-actors, but emphasizes only on
perception-action linkage. Let us consider the following scenario:
we could predict another car driver’s actions through shared
visual cues (e.g., traﬃc lights); but if we were to encounter an
automated self-driving car, would we not still anticipate that it
will stop at red lights and go at green? Turning back to our
experiment, we believe that the joint Simon task is possible with
any co-acting agent, during which a response conﬂict occurs
similar to the one that arises when a single person is in charge
of both responses. Thus far, our results are compatible with
ideomotor-derived theories, including the theory of event-coding
(Hommel, 2009), referential coding theory (Dolk et al., 2014),
and other extended frameworks (e.g., Prinz, 2015). Lastly, we
should note that although neither social nor spatial response
coding is essential for generating the joint Simon eﬀect, they
may have the potential to modulate how responses are coded and
represented.
Conclusion
The current research investigated the joint-actor and single-
actor Go/Nogo tasks in an fMRI scanner. We found that the
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joint Simon eﬀect can occur oﬄine with both biological and
computer co-actors; however, additional medial prefrontal cortex
is recruited when acting with a biological agent.
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